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CASES NOTED
DISCIPLINARY EXPULSION FROM A UNIVERSITY-
RIGHT TO NOTICE AND HEARING
Plaintiff, a student at a state university, was placed on disciplinary
probation by a faculty discipline committee. During the proceeding
plaintiff was not allowed to register. After the decision of the committee
he petitioned for late registration. This petition was denied by a faculty
committee of his college without affording him a hearing. Plaintiff again
petitioned at the commencement of the next trimester, but this petition
was summarily denied by university officials without notice or hearing.
Plaintiff brought an alternative writ of mandamus to require the university
to admit him to its college of architecture and fine arts. The circuit
court quashed the alternative writ of mandamus and plaintiff appealed.
The First District Court of Appeal, held, reversed with directions: Where
refusal of late registration to a student by a faculty committee of a
college at a tax supported state university amounted to expulsion of the
student and was made solely on the ground he had been charged with
misconduct, the committee's action was invalid since student was not
afforded due process. The university must first give notice of the charges
against the student and grant him a fair hearing before he may be
expelled. Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
The interest of institutions of higher learning in maintaining student
discipline and in retaining a discretionary right to dismiss, as opposed to a
student's individual interest in remaining in school, has created various
theories concerning the power which may be vested in an institution to
effectuate its policies. Among the theories most frequently used by the
courts are the in loco parentis doctrine,' which considers the university
and the student in a familial manner; the contract theory,2 which views
the relationships on a business basis; and more recently, the constitutional
interpretation,8 which weighs the interests of the opposing parties to
1. This doctrine gives universities the power to act as a parent and to establish rules
with the discretion of a parent disciplining his children. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla.
510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ; Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
2. The university and student enter into either an expressed contract, as evidenced by
the university catalog, or an implied contract, which acknowledges the university's authority
to discipline. Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Stetson Univ.
v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) ; Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231
N.Y.S. 435 (1928) ; Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923).
3. The due process clause places some limits on the absolute authority of universities to
expel students from public schools. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 930 (1961) ; Due v. Florida A.&M., 233 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. Fla. 1963); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). Contra,
Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
966 (1960).
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determine if there has been any deprivation of due process involved in the
university's execution of its right to take disciplinary action.
The law is well established in the area of academic dismissals.' How-
ever, the same cannot be said of disciplinary dismissals without notice
or hearing. Most cases in this area have dealt with the adequacy of the
hearing rather than whether a hearing and notice are in fact required.' As
far back as 1723 courts recognized the right to be heard before a uni-
versity could take steps to dismiss a master,' however they have been
reluctant to interfere with the discretion of university officials in disciplin-
ing students. The courts have held that unless it can be shown that a dis-
missal was arbitrary and capricious, the court will not review the exercise
of the university's honest discretion.7
Under the contract theory the proposition has been set forth that an
educational institution must have the right to establish rules and regula-
tions, and the courts should not intervene unless these rules are found to
be unreasonable.' A student is said to accept these rules upon applying for
admission on the basis of an expressed9 or implied"° contract. It has been
argued in rebuttal that even if the courts do apply the contractual theory,
the unequal bargaining positions of the two parties might enable the
courts to decide in favor of the student."'
Under the parental theory courts have ruled in favor of the university
by expounding upon the concept that university authorities take the place
of one's parents and are allowed wide discretion in maintaining disci-
pline.'" This theory could also be interpreted in favor of the student by
reasoning that an expulsion would involve a severance of the parental
relationship which would normally be undesirable save in extreme situa-
tions.1 8
4. No hearing is required when a student is expelled for academic reasons. Barnard v.
Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
5. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
6. King v. Chancellor of the Univ. of Cambridge, 2 Raym. Ld. 1334, 92 Eng. Rep. 370
(K.B. 1723).
7. Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); Newman v.
Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960) ; Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197
N.W. 510 (1924); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962);
Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932) ; Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209
Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
8. Lesser v. Board of Educ., 18 App. Div. 2d 388, 239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963); McGinnis
v. Walker, 40 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941) (dicta).
9. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928) (student deemed
to have entered contract with private university, which through statements in catalog ex-
pressly gave the university the power to expel without notice or reason).
10. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924).
11. See generally Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of
University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
12. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
13. Comment, supra note 11.
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Before 1958, however, only one case 4 had considered the theory of
procedural due process in relation to student dismissals without notice or
hearing. Prior decisions indicated that formal notice and a hearing are
not required.'" Recent decisions have indicated that procedural due
process will be considered, and notice and hearing required in public
institutions of higher learning.' 6 Some states have not been confronted
with the problem since they have statutes which require hearing and
notice in a public university before dismissal.'
The instant case follows the recent trend toward the application of
due process requirements. 8 An earlier federal decision in Florida, 9
although ruling that plaintiffs had failed to make a case, endorsed certain
criteria to insure procedural due process2 ° and set "fairness" as the
standard to follow in determining whether plaintiff's right to due process
had been preserved. Therefore, it seems the law in Florida today calls for
both notice and hearing before a public university may dismiss a student
for misconduct.
A dichotomy must be drawn at this point between public and private
universities. Although early decisions had held that notice and hearing
were required of a private university,2' later cases indicated that courts
would be more reluctant to interfere with university authorities at private
institutions.22 In a recent decision, University of Miami v. Militana,23 a
Florida court refused to recognize a medical student's plea of deprivation
of due process in being dismissed from a private university without a
hearing. The court held that students enter into a contractual relationship
with a private university in which university authorities have a wide
discretion in deciding matters of dismissal.24
14. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 748 (1943) (court held that due process was not applicable where there was a
rightful exercise of a university's inherent authority to discipline students).
15. Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) ; People ex rel. Bluett
v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956) ; State ex tel. Ingersoll v.
Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928) ; Vermillion v.
State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
16. Cases cited note 3 supra.
17. E.g., MASS. GEq. Am. LAWS ch. 76, § 17 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 13-1318
(1962).
18. Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
19. Due v. Florida A.&M., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
20. Due endorsed the criteria set forth in Dixon, namely, giving notice to students,
naming the witnesses (including a written or oral report as to the testimony of each witness)
and allowing an opportunity to present a defense with the introduction of the student's
witnesses.
21. Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14 (1904); Commonwealth ex iel.
Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).
22. See cases cited note 2 supra.
23. 184 So.2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
24. The student in this case plans to file a new suit in the federal court in an attempt to
halt federal grants to the university's medical school. Miami Herald, Oct. 24, 1966, § B at
1, col. 1 (city ed.).
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The principle of protection by procedural due process is more easily
recognized at public universities because they are similar to state agencies
and as such must follow constitutional rules of procedural due process.2"
The area of higher education is of such vital public concern that its
deprivation by any authority should be predicated upon conformity to
constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. In recognition of the
seriousness of expulsions for misconduct a tentative statement of policy
has been forwarded by the American Association of University Professors
which calls for both notice and hearing without mention of different
standards for private as opposed to public schools.26 Although strict
procedural requirements are not necessary, the lack of notice and hearing,
as in the instant case, are ample grounds for relief for a violation of due
process and should be considered as such both at public and private uni-
versities.
TIMOTHY G. ANAGNOST
THE CORPORATION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
The Plaintiff, a corporation, filed a complaint signed by the plaintiff's
president above the name of the corporation.1 Defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and to strike the complaint
upon the ground that it had not been signed by a licensed attorney.2 The
plaintiff then moved to amend the complaint by striking the name of the
corporation and the signature of its president and inserting the signature
of counsel. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike the
complaint and denied the plaintiff's motion to amend on the ground that a
corporation cannot appear or sign a pleading in proper person and that a
complaint which was signed by the president of a corporation who was not
an attorney' was a nullity and therefore not amendable. On appeal, held,
affirmed: a complaint filed by a plaintiff corporation through its president,
which does not bear the signature of an attorney, is a nullity and may not
be amended after the expiration of the statutory time for foreclosing a
25. "[N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Statement on the Academic Freedom of Students, 51 A.A.U.P. 447, 449 (1965).
1. The record indicates that the complaint was actually prepared by a licensed attorney
who would not sign it. No reason was given for his refusal to sign.
2. Rule 1.5 of the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at the time of the filing of
this case, provides in part:
(a) Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name . . ..
3. The fact that the corporation's president was not an attorney was not discussed in
the appellate court's opinion. The question does not appear to have been considered.
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